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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
For more than half a century psychologists have been interested in 
defining the psychological motives and tendencies that influence the ideological 
differences between differing social and political orientations.  Adorno’s (1950) 
landmark study of authoritarianism in personality, stimulated at least in part by 
concerns brought to the public consciousness by World War II, brought attention 
to the complex factors underlying the emergence of conservative personality 
styles. Since then research has focused on the identification of cognitive styles 
that structure the manner in which conservative beliefs are maintained and 
updated. Specifically, those who identify themselves as conservative frequently 
score higher on measures of need for cognitive closure (Kruglanski, 1994), 
dogmatism (Rokeach, 1960; Kohn, 1974; Kirton, 1978), intolerance for ambiguity 
(Kirton, 1978; Firbert & Ressler, 1998) and cognitive inflexibility (Kirton, 1978) 
than do liberal and moderate subjects. Research suggests that these styles of 
belief and information updating are influenced in part by parenting styles 
(Peterson, Smirles & Wentworth 1997), genetics (Alford, Funk, & Hibbing, 2005), 
and system justification (Jost et al. 2007).  
In addition, more recent research suggests a connection between 
neuropsychological factors and similar styles of belief updating (Niebauer et al. 
2004, Cacciopo, Petty, and Quintanar 1982; Amidio, 2007). Specifically, there is 
evidence indicating that the differing contribution of each hemisphere to 
information processing is associated with the degree to which a previously 
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established belief system is open to incorporation of new information. These 
results support a theory in which a left-hemisphere lateral preference reduces the 
degree of openness to belief updating and biases the individual towards 
conservative cognitive schema. Though such a theory is implicated by a review 
of the literature, there is little research directly exploring the relationship between 
lateral preference and the cognitive styles structuring belief updating. This study 
addressed this gap in the research by investigating the relationship between 
different styles of information processing and the role of the two hemispheres in 
belief updating as it relates to social and political orientation. 
The lexical decision task is a widely used approach to exploring the 
priming of semantic meaning and the course of determination of semantic 
meaning. In lexical decision studies, a prime word is briefly presented (20-750 
ms) followed by a target word, which the participant must identify as a word or 
non-word (Meyer & Schvaneveldt, 1971).  The first (prime) word is thought to 
cause a spreading activation throughout the semantic network, facilitating the 
lexical decision for related targets in comparison to unrelated targets (Neely, 
1976). Although both hemispheres represent similar semantic networks, the 
literature consistently supports that priming the right hemisphere results in a 
broad activation of both closely and remotely associated words whereas priming 
the left hemisphere activates a narrower cluster of strongly associated words, 
leading to the conclusion that the two hemispheres organize information 
differently. For example, the left-hemisphere appears to be associated with a 
narrow analysis of information and tight, discrete organization. In contrast, the 
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right hemisphere analyzes data from a broader perspective and organizes that 
information in a manner that requires less related associations (e.g., Beeman 
1993; Beeman & Chiarello, 1998; Beeman et al., 1994; Hutchinson et al., 2003).  
The use of a semantic priming task allows for examination of the unique 
contribution of each hemisphere to an individual’s processing and organization of 
semantic information. Although a considerable amount of research supports 
differences in the way that the right and left hemispheres process and organize 
information, little research exists relating the differences in information 
organization afforded by the two hemispheres to differences in belief updating. 
This study expanded our understanding of styles of belief updating as it relates to 
the relationship between the hemispheric structuring of information organization 
and social and political attitudes.  
Lateral Processing and Belief Updating 
The hemispheres of the brain differ in their organization and processing of 
semantic information (Chiarello, 1991; Beeman, 1993; Hutchinson, Whitman, 
Abeare & Raiter, 2003; Whitman, Holcomb & Zanes, 2010).  For example, 
semantic priming studies have shown that the left hemisphere is associated with 
activation of narrow analysis and strongly associated words, whereas the right 
hemisphere is associated with a broader activation and the inclusion of weakly 
associated words (e.g. Beeman, 1993; Beeman & Chiarello, 1998).  These 
findings reflect the different roles the hemispheres play in the organization of 
information.  The left-hemisphere organizes information tightly; whereas the right 
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organizes in a less narrow manner that requires fewer strong associations 
between concepts (Beeman et al., 1994).   
However, it is clear that the two hemispheres are not completely 
autonomous structures, operating only to accomplish their individualized tasks. 
Hutchinson, Whitman, Abeare and Raiter (2003) offered a model of semantic 
priming by which the two hemispheres function as an interacting system using 
both left narrow-activation and right-broad activation to apply meaning.  The 
study observed the effect of high and low associates and long (e.g., 400 ms) and 
short (e.g., 50 ms) stimulus onset asynchronies (SOA) in a lateralized lexical 
decision task.  This allowed for investigation into the differential semantic 
processing within and across the two hemispheres. In the short SOA condition, 
primes presented in the left hemisphere resulted in high-associate priming in 
both ipsilateral (same side) and contralateral (opposite side) presentations, 
whereas right hemisphere primes produced both high- and low-associate priming 
in both ipsilateral and contralateral presentations. This demonstrated that 
differential activation of the hemispheres occurs early in the processing of 
information and confirmed that regardless of target location, the left hemisphere 
shows narrow spread of activation and the right hemisphere shows broad 
activation. In contrast, in the long SOA condition, contralateral presentations 
resulted in high-associate priming in both visual field presentations.  
These results suggest that at these SOAs, the pattern of activation of a 
hemisphere was transferred to the opposite hemisphere, indicating the 
importance of the interaction between the two hemispheres in information 
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processing. Coupled with Chiarello et al.’s (1990) findings that priming is stronger 
when a centralized prime is used, these results indicate that both hemispheres 
need access to the information in order to integrate the complementary left- and 
right-hemisphere semantic networks. This model suggests that the two 
hemispheres function as a continuously interacting system by which the left 
hemisphere is used to narrowly define words, while the right hemisphere 
provides the background arousal necessary to efficiently consider alternative 
meanings.  (Hutchinson, Whitman, Abeare & Raiter, 2003). 
Similar to Hutchinson and colleagues’ model, other research suggests that 
the two hemispheres play different, yet interacting roles in the formation and 
preservation of beliefs. Ramachandran (1995), for example, offers a model of 
belief formation and maintenance that allows for the comparison of the roles 
each hemisphere plays in these two stages of belief composition. His model is 
based on his work with patients suffering from Anosognosia, a condition in which 
a person who suffers disability due to brain injury seems unaware of or denies 
the existence of his or her handicap. Anosognosia is almost always preceded by 
right hemisphere damage and is characterized by the individual’s tendency to 
revert back to descriptions of pre-morbid abilities when describing their current 
level of functioning; in essence underestimating their deficiencies.  In extreme 
instances, after failure to complete the task, when asked to describe what 
happened, patients with Anosognosia deny any faults and maintain that they had 
completed the task successfully.  
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For example, a patient might be asked to place several rings around free-
standing pegs, and if unable to complete the task will often give up. However, 
upon being asked how the task went they will be firm in stating that they have 
completed the task successfully and always have been able to do such a simple 
task. Such observations led Ramachandran to conclude that damage to the right 
hemisphere results in failure to modify images of the self in terms of physical 
and/or cognitive functioning.  Because an overwhelming majority of cases are 
seen in those with right-hemispheric lesions it strengthens the theory that an 
unimpaired right hemisphere is needed for proper information updating.   
According to Ramachandran (1995), the left-hemisphere is responsible for 
organizing information in a fashion that assists persons to maintain a stable belief 
system.  The left-hemisphere constructs belief systems that are tightly associated 
and lack the ability to cope with inconsistencies.  In contrast, the right-
hemisphere acts as a “devil’s advocate” for the brain.  In his “devil’s advocate” 
model, Ramachandran believes that the right hemisphere processes information 
that has reached beyond the threshold of consistency afforded by the left-
hemisphere and “forces” the left hemisphere to change the belief accordingly.  
The responsibility of the right hemisphere may better be explained in terms of a 
cognitive function, whereby it remains vigilant for changes in the environment, 
similar to Hutchinson et al.’s theory based on her studies involving semantic 
priming. 
Studies on visual-spatial attention also reflect the inability to refine belief 
systems after unilateral brain damage.  Research by Michael Posner has focused 
7 
 
  
on attention deficit and visual neglect as corresponding to damage of the right 
posterior parietal lobe (Posner, 1984).  Patients with right parietal lobe damage 
often neglect the left side of their world.  In one study, participants were first cued 
to the visual field corresponding to their lesioned hemisphere and then were 
asked to respond to a target presented to the opposite side of their body (which 
they typically neglected). They would react slower or miss the targets completely, 
as opposed to when their attention was first cued to the side opposite their lesion.  
Results were more significant if the lesion was in the right side of their parietal 
lobe.  This shows that neglect patients with right hemisphere lesions have a 
harder time disconnecting their attention from where they expect a stimulus to 
appear and cannot re-direct their attention (update belief in stimulus appearance) 
in light of new visual information (Posner, 1984). 
Research involving non-patient populations demonstrates the differing 
contributions of the hemispheres in real world belief formation and maintenance.  
For example, Cacciopo, Petty, and Quintana (1982) used EEG to assess 
hemispheric activation while they presented college students with statements 
that were pro-attitudinal or counter-attitudinal to their own pre-screened beliefs. 
Those individuals with right hemisphere patterns of lateral preference rated 
counter-attitudinal statements as more attention grabbing than pro-attitudinal 
statements.  Those individuals characterized by activation of the left hemisphere 
reported the opposite.  This suggests that the presence of relative right 
hemisphere activation allows an individual to be more attentive to statements 
contradictory to his or her previous held beliefs.  Similarly, Drake and Bingham 
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(1985) showed that activation of the left hemisphere results in defiance to 
counter-attitudinal statements.  Individuals presented with counter-attitudinal 
statements to their left ear (right hemisphere) were significantly more in 
agreement with the message than those presented with the same counter-
attitudinal message heard only in their right ear (left hemisphere).  Statements 
were rated as counter to all individuals’ beliefs prior to presentation, meaning that 
relative activation of the right hemisphere (presentation to the left ear) resulted in 
willingness to recognize and consider differences in their belief system, whereas 
the initial processing by the left hemisphere resulted in resistance to 
inconsistencies with the belief system.  
Other research supports hemispheric differences in processing 
information in various cognitive tasks associated with belief formation and 
conservation including sensory information, and deductive reasoning. For 
example, Fink et al. (1999) used Positron Emission Topography (PET) 
measurements to identify brain regions involved in the monitoring of what a 
person saw themselves doing versus what they felt themselves doing. The 
researchers found that mismatches between visual and proprioceptive feedback 
of sensory experiences led to increased activation in the right hemisphere. This 
finding indicates that, in the context of sensory systems, the right hemisphere 
remains vigilant for inconsistencies in the sensory environment. Goel and Dolan 
(2003) presented a series of syllogistic deductive reasoning tasks to participants 
while utilizing functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to identify the 
associated neuroanatomical structures involved. Participants were presented 
9 
 
  
with syllogisms that varied with respect to the believability of the content. For 
example, in some cases the syllogisms were consistent with previously held 
beliefs about the world (i.e. some children are not Canadians; all Canadians are 
people; therefore, some people are not Canadians) while in others, the 
syllogisms were not consistent with beliefs held by the general public (i.e. no 
harmful substances are natural; all poisons are natural; therefore, no poisons are 
harmful). Syllogisms also varied with respect to the validity of the logic presented. 
The authors found that belief-laden reasoning involved a left temporal system; 
however, when there was a discrepancy of agreement between the logical 
inference of a syllogism and a previously held belief, the right prefrontal cortex 
became involved. For example, in the following syllogism: all calculators are 
machines; all computers are calculators; therefore some machines are not 
computers, the logic itself is invalid but the final conclusion is consistent with 
general beliefs about the world. Participants who were able to circumvent their 
beliefs and follow the logic to a correct conclusion evidenced significantly greater 
right prefrontal activity relative to those who made incorrect inferences. The 
individuals in the latter group were presumably so biased by their beliefs that 
they came to an erroneous inference when faced with belief-logic conflict. These 
studies all offer support for the models previously discussed, which suggest an 
interaction between the hemispheres in information processing and belief 
updating where by increased right hemisphere lateral preference results in more 
flexibility in belief updating. 
Sociopolitical Attitudes and Belief Updating 
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In 2003, Jost et al. developed the Motivated Social Cognitive Model to 
explain which “cognitive motivations” are most influential in the expression of 
social and political conservatism. In this model, motivational and informational 
influences act together on belief formation and updating. Put simply, 
informational influences received by the individual play a role in justifying the 
formation of the belief, whereas cognitive motives (which collectively form an 
individual’s cognitive style) seek to organize belief structure and regulate 
updating. According to Jost, certain cognitive styles help to predict the degree to 
which a preexisting belief is receptive to incorporation of new information. Within 
the styles identified by Jost as relating to conservatism is a collection of cognitive 
motivations (e.g. dogmatism, need for cognitive closure, and intolerance for 
ambiguity) used to describe the method of belief updating similar to those 
previously identified as relating to left hemisphere bias in information processing.  
The meta-analysis on which this theory is largely formed points to an 
overwhelming amount of evidence supporting theories that higher resistance to 
belief updating is found among social and political conservatives (Jost et al., 
2003).  
The hypothesis that conservatives implement a kind of belief resistance 
has driven the research surrounding many of the cognitive motives implemented 
in the above model, including authoritarianism (Adorno et al., 1950), dogmatism 
(Rokeach, 1960) and intolerance for ambiguity (Frenkel-Brunswick, 1949). These 
theories including more modern examples e.g. Schaller et al.’s (1995) personal 
need for structure and Webster and Kruglanski’s (1994) need for cognitive 
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closure, are the manners of belief updating identified by Jost, not as the single, 
but a major contributing factor to conservatism within an individual. However, 
controversy has surrounded the claims that rigid thinking is found exclusively 
among individuals who identified with conservative sociopolitical beliefs. It cannot 
be denied that individual conservatives can call for change and some liberals 
rigidly defend their ideals.  However, even when dogmatism has been identified 
in liberals compared to moderates, the scores among the conservatives are even 
higher. Further, researchers argue that even if exemplars of dogmatic left-
wingers can be identified an area of research has not emerged suggesting a 
strong relationship between dogmatism and liberals (Stone, 1980; Altemeyer, 
1998; Biling, 1984).  
In an attempt to develop a neutral measure of dogmatism, Rokeach 
(1960) developed a scale of dogmatism that relied on the identification of 
“double-think” in which items were used to identify the degree to which an 
individual was susceptible to contradiction to their own beliefs. Seen as a more 
balanced form with which to measure resistance to belief adaptation, it has been 
used in various studies which have linked attitude resistance to conservative 
belief formation and updating (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski & Sulloway 2003; 
Rokeach, 1960; Christie, 1991; Stacy & Green, 1971). Additionally, intolerance 
for ambiguity has also been empirically supported as a component of the right-
wing belief system. In Jost, et al.’s (2003) meta-analysis large effect sizes (d = 
1.46, p < .001; d = .56, p <.001) were found for the relationship between 
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intolerance for ambiguity and right-wing beliefs in a handful of studies (e.g. Kirton, 
1978 and Sidanius, 1978).  
Additional theories focusing on the cognitive motives underlying 
conservative ideals have focused on finality in belief updating. Specifically, the 
need for cognitive closure has been hypothesized to be a characteristic of belief 
updating in conservative individuals. Webster and Kruglanski (1994) developed 
the Need for Cognitive Closure Scale (NFCS) to assess individual differences in 
the impulse to make decisions that are quick and firm. In a validation study for 
the scale Webster and Kuruglanksi (1994) found a significant correlation (r = .27, 
p < .01) between high scores on the NFCS and self-report measures of 
authoritarianism. In an attempt to associate content free desire for quick 
decision-making and political attitudes associated with conservatives Jost (1999) 
compared participants’ scores on the NFCS with belief in the death penalty. It 
was hypothesized that beliefs commonly associated with conservatism, such as 
the death penalty are often “unambiguous, permanent and final,” and driven by 
the need for cognitive closure. The results of the study revealed that scores on 
the NFCS significantly predicted belief in the death penalty, and the best 
predictors of a high need for cognitive closure were subscales measuring 
discomfort of ambiguity and need for structure. These results suggest that the 
manner of belief updating may affect the content of the belief itself, offering 
further evidence that characteristics of belief maintenance could act as predictors 
of social and political attitudes. 
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Recent investigations into the development of conservative beliefs 
involved the assignment of perceived threat as a contributing factor to right-wing 
ideals. These studies suggested that cognitively rigid psychological motives are 
strengthened in response to fear and threat that continue to drive the formation 
and maintenance of conservative beliefs. A combination of three studies 
conducted just prior to the 2004 presidential election strengthened the argument 
for an association between cognitive rigidity and conservative vs. liberal beliefs. 
Jost (2007), in endorsement of the uncertainty-threat model of conservatism, was 
able to establish a significant relationship between self-reported levels of 
cognitive rigidity (through surveys of need for closure, openness etc.), political 
conservatism, and perceptions of system threat. Additional analysis of measures 
revealed that uncertainty avoidance and threat management through cognitive 
rigidity are associated with conservative ideals and not extremity of beliefs in 
general (i.e. being extremely liberal). This is further support that an individual’s 
receptiveness to belief updating may be associated with his/her social or political 
orientation versus the strength of their ideologies. 
Neurocognitive structures and Sociopolitical Attitudes 
Only recently have researchers become interested in the direct 
relationship between neuropsychological factors and beliefs within a social and 
political context. Studies have identified neural correlates of political information 
processing and candidate preferences (Kaplan, Freedman & Iacoboni, 2007; 
Knuston, Wood, Spampinato & Grafman 2006; Amidio, 2007). The investigation 
headed by Kaplan (2007) was conducted during the 2004 presidential campaign. 
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Participants were involved in an event-related functional MRI paradigm in which 
they were shown pictures of candidates’ faces and asked to respond with how 
they felt about each candidate. When shown pictures of candidates to whom they 
gave negative responses, the participants showed a significant increase in 
cerebral blood flow to the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and the anterior 
cingulated gyrus compared to when they were shown pictures of candidates 
associated with the party with which they self-identified or rated favorably. This 
evidence is the first step in suggesting that different neuro-mechanisms may be 
involved in pro and counter-attitudinal information processing related to political 
beliefs.  
In ground-breaking research Amidio (2007) was able to connect both rigid 
cognitive structures and their underlying neural mechanisms to political 
orientation. The study found that stronger social liberalism was correlated with 
greater accuracy in conflictual decision-making. Amidio used the Go-No-Go task 
to demonstrate this finding. During the task a participant is seated in front of a 
computer screen and asked to hit a button every time they see the stimulus word, 
and to not respond when a different word is displayed. Greater accuracy in 
shifting from a previous string of Go (or No-Go) responses to a single or shorter 
string of the opposite response pattern: No-Go (or Go) was significantly 
correlated with liberalism vs. conservatism. Additionally, evidence supported 
greater involvement of the anterior cingulate gyrus during conflictual decision-
making in political liberals relative to political conservatives. The frontal-cingulate 
gyrus circuit is known to be active whenever conflict or contention scheduling 
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(action selection) is required.  This suggests that conservatism is related to 
greater persistence in response patterns, despite evidence that this response 
pattern should change and that liberals may be more neurologically sensitive to 
cognitive conflict. These findings relate to earlier research, which suggest that 
sensitivity to cognitive inconsistencies afforded by the right hemisphere also lead 
to quick information updating and adaptation. Thus a neuropsychological model 
of belief formation and updating may be able to offer insight into the relationship 
between cognitive motives and styles previously identified as relating to social 
and political attitudes.  
In summary, bias in mental representations and belief systems has been 
linked to asymmetries in information processing by the two hemispheres in 
research that uses wide variety of methodologies and participant samples. Also, 
associations have been drawn between such biases in belief systems and 
sociopolitical orientation leading to the hypothesis that links can be drawn from 
lateral processing through cognitive style to social and political orientation. Based 
on research supporting these general conclusions, the assumptions of the model 
for this project are as follows: First, the hemispheres participate in a reciprocal 
exchange of information whereby the left hemisphere seeks to rigidly construct 
belief systems while the right hemisphere identifies information and obliges 
modification of existing belief structures. Such a dual hemispheric model is useful 
in explaining individual differences in belief formation and updating.  Differences 
in relative activation of one hemisphere over another may account for differing 
degrees of adoption/rejection of beliefs in individuals. For example, the degree to 
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which information is being processed and organized by the left hemisphere will 
affect the flexibility with which beliefs can be updated. Additionally, the intensity 
and degree to which the hemispheres are able to exchange information based on 
their unique organization processes is likely to influence the formation and 
updating of beliefs, as well.  
Secondly, the study assumes that the manner in which an individual is 
receptive to incorporation of new information into preexisting belief schema is 
structured in terms of his/her cognitive style. Cognitive style can be measured by 
evaluating the degree to which underlying cognitive motives are present. For 
example, a rigid cognitive style would be described in terms of how dogmatic and 
intolerant of ambiguity a person is, while a more open cognitive style may 
describe a person in terms of cognitive complexity and flexibility (Jost et al., 
2003). One major goal of the study was to elucidate the relationship between 
these variables by providing a neurocognitve model of social and political 
attitudes in which the cognitive style employed to structure belief updating 
mediates the relationship between lateral preference for information organization 
and sociopolitical orientation. The study used methods established by Baron and 
Kenny (1968) to examine the correlational relationships between, measures of 
need for cognitive closure, dogmatism, openness, social attitudes, and semantic 
processing in the left and right hemispheres. The major predictions for the study 
were as follows:  
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Prediction #1: 
It is hypothesized that greater contributions of the left hemisphere on a 
lateralized lexical decision making task will be significantly associated with 
higher levels of characterological rigidity as assessed via measures of 
style of belief updating and more conservative sociopolitical orientation.  
Prediction #2: 
It is hypothesized that a higher degree of hemispheric collaboration on a 
lateralized lexical decision making task will be significantly associated with 
lower levels of charecterological rigidity and a more liberal sociopolitical 
orientation.  
Prediction #3:  
It is hypothesized that higher levels of charecterological rigidity will be 
significantly associated with higher levels of conservatism.  
Prediction #4:  
It is hypothesized that the relationship between laterality and cognitive 
style of belief updating will be stronger than that of laterality and political 
affiliation. 
Prediction # 5: 
Lastly, it is hypothesized that cognitive style of belief updating (how 
receptive the belief system is to incorporation of new information) will be 
established as a mediator for the relationship between both lateral 
preference and sociopolitical attitudes, as well as, hemispheric 
communication and sociopolitical attitudes. 
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CHAPTER 2 
METHODS 
Participants 
The entire sample consisted of 130 participants who were recruited from 
the Wayne State University undergraduate subject pool and on campus political 
organizations. Participants were neurologically intact and had normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision. Participants were screened for history of brain injury, 
stroke, learning disability, or seizure disorder. Participants taking medications 
that could slow their reaction time were also excluded.  
Stimuli 
The lateralized semantic priming experiment consisted of 552 trials 
divided into four blocks of 138 trials. Each trial consisted of an English word 
prime followed by a target string that was either an English word or a 
pronounceable nonsense word. Nonsense words were created by altering a 
single phonemic segment of a legal English word (i.e. burple, meam, flid). Half of 
the trials were non-word targets while the other half consisted of word targets. In 
the word target condition, each prime was combined with one of three target 
types—high associate (e.g. CLEAN-DIRTY), low associate (e.g. CLEAN-TIDY), 
and unrelated (e.g. CLEAN-FAMILY) — and counterbalanced across visual field 
(VF) locations (Left VF-Left VF, Left VF-Right VF, Right VF-Left VF, Right VF-
Right VF).   
Association strength of the word lists were determined using Nelson, 
McEvoy, & Schreiber's (1994) word association norms. High associate targets 
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only included primary associates to the prime in which at least 30% of 
participants reported that associate immediately upon free association. Target 
words with a 1 to 5% response rate to the prime words were classified in the low 
associate prime condition. Unrelated target words were those with no empirical 
relationship to the prime. All prime and target words used had a minimum 
frequency of 20 per million. All stimuli were printed in black, lowercase, 20-point 
courier font, and presented against a white background. The inner edge of each 
prime and target was presented 1 degree to the left or right of center and all trials 
were randomized.  
Measures 
Need for Closure Scale.  Webster and Kruglanski (1994) developed and 
validated their 42-item Need for Closure Scale (NFCS), which consists of five 
empirically derived subscales. The first subscale assesses the preference for 
order and structure (e.g. “I think that having clear rules and order at work is 
essential for success”). Emotional discomfort associated with ambiguity 
characterizes the second subscale (e.g. “I’d rather know bad news than stay in a 
state of uncertainty”). The third subscale assesses impatience and impulsivity in 
decision-making (e.g. “I usually make important decisions quickly and 
confidently”). A desire for security and predictability is assessed by the fourth 
scale (e.g. “I don’t like to go into a situation without knowing what I can expect 
from it”). The fifth scale is designed to assess for closed-mindedness (e.g. “I do 
not usually consult many different opinions before forming my own view”). 
Responses are made on a 6-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) 
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to 6 (strongly agree). This measure has produced scores with satisfactory 
reliability (Cronbach’s α = 0.84, test-retest reliability over 12 weeks = 0.86) and 
construct validation (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). 
Dogmatism. Shearman and Levine (2006) have developed an 11-item 
dogmatism scale that utilizes updated item wordings and that corrects for the 
psychometric problems of previous dogmatism scales. They identified four 
central characteristics of the dogmatic cognitive style that guided both their 
conceptualization of the construct and the design of their scale. These 
characteristics include a) open-mindedness vs. closed-mindedness, b) the 
degree to which an individual believes that a single view is correct, c) the extent 
to which viewpoints incompatible with an individual’s own are rejected, and d) an 
unquestioning respect for authority. Responses are made on a 5 point Likert 
scale. The 11 items are consistent with a unidimensional model of dogmatism as 
indicated by results of factor analytic techniques. Validation studies have 
provided evidence consistent with construct validity (Shearman & Levine, 2006).  
The Big Five Inventory (BFI). The Big Five Inventory is a 44-item scale 
developed by John, Donahue, and Kentle (1991) designed to measure the core 
features of the big five personality traits traditionally defined as openness, 
conscientiousness, extroversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism. The 
advantage of the BFI over parallel measures of personality is its low demand on 
research time as well as the use of short phrases as item stems instead of the 
complex sentences or single word adjectives used in other versions. Responses 
are made on a 5 point Likert scale. In past research, this measure has produced 
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satisfactory alpha reliability overall (Cronbach’s α = 0.83; test-retest reliabilities 
after 3 months = .85) as well as within the individual BFI scales (range = 0.79 to 
0.88). For the present study, the openness factor is of greatest interest (α = 0.81). 
Validation studies have provided evidence consistent with both convergent and 
divergent validity with other big five instruments and informer ratings. 
Conservatism (C-Scale) Short Form.  William and Patterson (1996) have 
developed a 12-item conservatism scale that utilizes updated item wordings and 
social concerns.  It is an adaptation of the original, 50-item, William Patterson 
Attitude Inventory (WPAI).  They identified 27 items from the original scale with 
modifications suggested by Collins and Hayes (1993).  The new scale functions 
well as a measure of conservatism with satisfactory alpha reliability (α = .81). By 
eliminating items with poor item-total correlation (< .2) and those that had weak 
loadings on the first five factors; 12 items were established.  
Intolerance for Ambiguity. Tolerance for ambiguity was measured using 
Bedner’s (1962) scale, which consists of 16 items, 8 of which are worded 
positively and 8 of which are worded negatively. Respondents indicate their 
agreement with items using a 7-point Likert scale ranging from very strong 
disagreement (1) to very strong agreement (7). The instrument measures both a 
person's dislike for ambiguous situations and his or her preference for certainty. 
High scorers seek definitive and final answers to problems. Past research on the 
IAS has yielded alpha coefficients ranging from .52 to .62 (DeForge & Sobal, 
1989). Test-retest reliability coefficients included .85 for a 2-week to 2-month 
retesting and .73 for a 6-month retesting (Budner, 1962; DeForge & Sobal, 1989).   
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Political Orientation. Political orientation was self-reported using a single 10-
point Likert scale ranging from -5 extremely liberal to +5 extremely conservative, 
with an option for the participant to respond neither.  This was adapted from the 
bipolar scale presented in Knight’s (1999) chapter of Measures of Political 
Attitudes.  An advantage of this method is the creation of proximity and difference 
measures to contrast participants’ positions (Knight, 1999).  This type of scale 
has been used for decades in various methods of research projects including 
national census telephone surveys, validation of scales and various studies 
investigating political behavior.                 
Right-Wing Authoritarianism. Altermeyer’s (1981, 1988, 1996) 30-item RWA  
Scale assesses three major constructs: authoritarian aggression, authoritarian 
submission, and conventionality (example item: "It is wonderful that young people 
can protest against anything they don't like, and act however they wish 
nowadays"). The RWA is rated on a nine-point scale, ranging from very strong 
agreement (+4) to very strong disagreement (−4), with neutral defined as 0. The 
scale has been designed to be one-dimensional (Altemeyer, 1996), and an 
overall RWA score is calculated by summing all items after reverse-coding 
several items. In one of the most recent publications utilizing the scale the 
internal consistency of the RWA was α = 0.93 (Swami, Furnham, & 
Christopher,2008).                                                                                            
Social and Political attitudes were measured using an 11-item list of current 
issues to which participants are to respond with the degree that they oppose or 
support the issue with 1-“strongly oppose” to 9-“strongly agree” Examples of 
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some of the issues listed are “stem cell research,” “affirmative action policies,” 
and “stricter sentencing of drug offenders.” This scale was developed by Jost 
(2005) to act as a short measure of political attitudes similar to the Wilson-
Patterson C-Scale, but with more modern examples of political issues. The 
issues that are important in defining social and political orientation change 
drastically over time making it an advantage to include this short measure.                                                                                                               
Procedure 
Informed consent was obtained for all participants. Subjects were tested 
over a single session lasting approximately 2.5 hours. Trained research 
assistants administered testing and questionnaires. Subjects currently enrolled in 
psychology classes were granted class credit for their participation. Participants 
obtained through other recruitment methods were paid a $15 honorarium.  
At the start of each session participants completed initial screening 
measures consisting of the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (Oldfield, 1971; 
Dragovic, 2004), the reading subtest of the Wide Range Achievement Test – 
Fourth Edition (WRAT-IV; Wilkinson & Robertson, 2006), and a subject data form 
used to collect demographic information. The semantic priming experiment was 
run on a 166 MHz Pentium 2 personal computer using SuperLab Pro to generate 
the experiment and record both reaction time and subject accuracy. Participants 
were seated a fixed distance from the computer screen (approximately 18 
inches) and proper positioning of the chin was ensured with a chin rest. Each 
participant was given practice trials consisting of primes and targets that were not 
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used during the actual test trials. Participants began the test trials immediately 
following the practice trials. 
Trials consisted of a focusing mark (*) in the center of the screen for 1000 
ms, followed by the prime, which was randomly projected to either the left or right 
visual field. Two stimulus onset asynchronies (SOA), the length of time allowed 
to pass between the presentation of the prime and the target, were utilized (50 
ms and 400 ms). These SOAs have provided strong results in studies from our 
laboratory and have unique reciprocal profiles that have implications for both 
automatic and conscious processing.    
For all SOA conditions, the primes and targets were projected to the same 
visual field [left visual field (LVF) or right visual field (RVF)] in one-half of the 
trials; in the other half, the prime and target were projected to different visual 
fields (i.e. prime to LVF, target to RVF; prime to RVF, target to LVF). Following 
the presentation of the target, subjects made a lexical decision for the target 
word by pressing the appropriate button (i.e., 'WORD' or 'NONWORD') on a 
button box. The order of trials was randomized for each participant.  
The presentation of the semantic priming task and the questionnaire 
measures was counterbalanced. Within the questionnaires those directly 
addressing political orientation were administered last as to not guide the 
participants to answer the questions regarding specific beliefs in one manner or 
another.  
Data Analysis 
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Mean reaction time and accuracy were computed for each participant 
based on correct lexical decisions in the word conditions, with outliers (i.e., those 
scores that fell more than 1.5 x the interquartile range below the first quartile or 
more than 1.5 x the interquartile range above the third quartile) removed. The 
priming effect was calculated as the difference in reaction times (RT) between 
unrelated and related trials; the traditional method for determining priming effects 
using high and low associates. Specifically, semantic priming for the high 
associate condition is defined as RT unrelated/neutral condition - RT high 
associate condition. Priming for the low associate condition is RT 
unrelated/neutral condition - RT low associate condition.  
To assess the relative contributions of the left vs. right hemisphere in the 
lexical decision making task, a laterality index (Brugger, Gamma, Muri, Schafer, 
and Taylor, 1993) was computed as follows: Laterality Index = (correct decisions 
in the LVF – correct decisions in the RVF)/(correct decisions in the LVF + correct 
decisions in the RVF). The laterality index varies between -1 (maximal left-
hemisphere asymmetry) and +1 (maximal right-hemisphere asymmetry). Values 
of zero reflect equal accuracy in both visual fields and theoretically are indicative 
of no hemispheric asymmetry. Likewise, to assess the degree to which the left 
hemisphere “accepts” information from the right hemisphere and vice versa, 
interhemispheric communication indexes were computed using similar analyses, 
by comparing accuracy in contralateral conditions (i.e. prime to right visual field 
and target to left visual field) with accuracy in the ipsilateral condition (i.e. prime 
and target to the same visual field). Values approaching positive one are 
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indicative of greater interhemispheric communication. Using lexical decision 
making to assess for patterns of laterality automatically elicits better left 
hemisphere performance because of that hemisphere’s presumed dominance for 
language. Therefore, there is great value to calculating a laterality index that 
yields a ratio, which represents the relative performance of the right hemisphere 
in the context of left hemisphere performance and relative performance of 
contralateral conditions to ispsilateral conditions.  
For the questionnaire measures, composite scores were computed by 
summing across responses to each item after reverse scoring appropriate items. 
For all the self-report measures, larger composite scores are indicative of larger 
“amounts” of the construct of interest. The Cronbach’s α statistic was calculated 
for each of the questionnaires in order to ensure the internal consistency and 
reliability of the measure within our sample. The Cronbach’s α statistics revealed 
that each of the questionnaires produced valid and reliable scores within our 
sample (Table 1).  
To test for individual predictions regarding the relationship among 
hemispheric laterality and style of belief updating bivariate correlation coefficients 
were calculated between the indicators of laterality at 50 and 400 ms and a 
rigidity in belief updating latent factor calculated from the openness, Dogmatism, 
Need for Closure, Right-Wing Authoritarianism and Intolerance of Ambiguity 
measures. Bivariate correlations were also calculated between laterality indexes 
and a sociopolitical latent factor constructed form scores on the social and 
political orientation measures. Finally a correlation was also calculated between 
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the two latent factors in order to check for fulfillment of the initial assumptions of 
the proposed mediation model.  
In order to assess the proposed prediction that the relationship between 
cognitive style of belief updating (characterological rigidity) and political affiliation 
is stronger than the relationship between hemispheric contribution and political 
affiliation Fisher’s r-to-Z transformations were conducted and a z-test of 
significance was computed to assess for significant differences between the 
correlations. 
A series of multiple regression analyses were used to complete the 
assessment of the mediation model, and determine if cognitive style of belief 
updating mediates the relationship between lateral preference and political belief 
system. Assumptions regarding the presence of a mediation relationship were 
assessed in accordance with the procedures outlined by Baron and Kenny 
(1986).  
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CHAPTER 3 
RESULTS 
Data Screening  
Prior to analysis, Dogmatism, Openness, Need for Closure, Conservatism 
(C-scale), Intolerance for Ambiguity, Right-Wing Authoritarianism, Sociopolitical 
Orientation, Current Affairs and reaction time and accuracy for the Lexical 
Decision Making Task (LDMT) were examined for missing data, fit between their 
distributions, and the assumptions of multivariate analyses as outlined by 
Tabachnick and Fidel (2007). The variables were examined for the entire sample 
of 130 participants given that the proposed analyses would be performed on 
ungrouped data.  
An initial screen of the variables’ descriptive statistics revealed plausible 
means and standard deviations for each of the variables. Additionally, the 
coefficient of variation (SD/M) for each variable revealed a suitable ratio between 
the means and standard deviations acceptable for completing subsequent 
analyses (i.e. values < .0001).  
Missing data screening revealed that among the 130 participants, four of 
the subjects’ priming data did not yield a sufficient amount of data points to 
accurately calculate laterality and interhemispheric communication indexes. 
Additionally, two cases in the sample performed below an 8th grade reading level. 
These cases were also significantly less accurate on the LDMT. These six cases 
were excluded from analyses involving the LDMT. Additionally, a case with a 
single missing value on the Openness domain of the BFI was identified. Two 
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cases with a single missing value on Intolerance of Ambiguity and one case with 
a single missing value on Need for Closure were also identified. These cases 
were retained as their inclusion or exclusion did not affect the outcome of 
subsequent analyses.  
Normality of the variables was initially assessed using skewness and 
kurtosis statistics. The three sociopolitical affiliation measures were found to 
have a significant positive skew and were corrected using a square root 
transformation. Pairwise linearity and assumptions of homoscedisticity were 
checked using bivariate scatterplots and found to be satisfactory based on visual 
criteria outlined by Tabachnick and Fidel (2007). Two cases in the sample were 
univariate outliers because of their extreme z-scores (indicative of very poor 
performance) for accuracy on the LDMT. At this level of screening, these outliers 
did not affect the outcome of subsequent analyses and they were retained. By 
using Mahalanobis distance with p < .001, two cases were identified as 
multivariate outliers. These cases were also considered an outlier by univariate 
screening procedures on other variables; thus, these cases were deleted leaving 
128 cases in the overall sample. Table 2 summarizes demographic 
characteristics for the sample of 128 individuals.  
Prior to examining the main predictions, data yielded from the lateralized 
lexical decision making task were analyzed in such a way as to determine that the 
experiment was properly assessing activation of semantic networks and 
hemispheric preference. Specifically, accuracy, reaction time and semantic priming 
effects were examined in order to assess differences between association 
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strengths, SOA and side of presentation. Tables 3 through 7 display the means 
and standard deviations for the reaction time, accuracy and priming data obtained 
from the lateralized lexical decision making task.  
Lateralized Lexical Decision Making: Reaction Time 
Mean reaction times for correct responses to word target trials were 
submitted to a 2 (SOA) x 3 (association strength) x 2 (side of prime) x 2 (side of 
target) repeated measures ANOVA, using the Greenhous-Geisser correction for 
degrees of freedom when the assumption of sphericity was not met. The results of 
the ANOVA revealed that the main effect for SOA was not significant indicating the 
participants’ response times were equally fast for the 400ms SOA condition and 
the 50ms SOA condition. The main effects for side of prime and side of target were 
also not found to be significant. However, several other main effects and 
interactions were found to be significant. Specifically, the main effect for 
association strength was found F (2, 202) = 41.84, p < .001, ηp2 = .255, with high 
associates resulting in the fastest reaction times (M = 578.21ms), followed by low 
associates (M = 643.98ms) and neutral associates (M = 665.82ms), respectively. 
Additionally, a prime x target interaction was significant F (1,122) = 144.75, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .543, in which ipsilateral presentations resulted in faster reaction 
times (M = 568.39) than contralateral presentations (M = 651.29). Also, a 
significant SOA x prime x target interaction was found F (1,121) = 41.47, p  <.01, 
ηp2 = .254. Post hoc analyses utilizing the Tukey HSD method for correction of 
family wise error show that in the 400ms SOA, there was no difference in reaction 
times between different visual field presentations for primes or targets. However, at 
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the 50 ms SOA, presentation of the prime to the right visual field and target to left 
visual field (RVF-LVF) resulted in slower reaction times than LVF-RVF stimulus 
presentation. Figures 1 and 2 display a summary of the reaction time results at 
both SOAs.  
Lateralized Lexical Decision Making: Priming 
Semantic priming effects involve comparing the facilitation of word 
identification when targets are both high and low semantic associates of their 
primes. Within this paradigm, it is expected that facilitation or word identification 
will be greater for highly related target words compared to their less related 
semantic counterparts and that hemispheric differences will be observed. A 2 
(SOA) x 2 (association strength) x 2 (side of prime) x 2 (side of target) was 
examined for significant differences in priming across the three within subject 
variables. A main effect for SOA was found F (1, 130) = 11.61, p = .01, ηp2 
= .083, such that the 400ms SOA resulted in more priming (M = 58.63) than the 
50ms SOA (M = 6.12). Another significant main effect was found for association 
strength F (1,130) = 39.319, p < .01, ηp2 = .234, such that high associates (M = 
51.27) resulted in more priming than low associates (M = 23.5). A SOA x 
association strength interaction was also found to be significant F (1,130) = 28.07, 
p < .01, ηp2 = .179. Post hoc analyses, utilizing the Tukey HSD method for 
correction of family wise error show that in the 400ms SOA, high associates 
prime more than low associates, t (121) = 6.118, p < .001, while in the 50ms 
SOA, there is no significant difference in priming between high and low 
associates, t (121) = 1.265, p = .210. Additionally, high associates in the 400ms 
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SOA condition primed significantly more than high associates, t (121) = 3.218, p 
= .002, and low associates, t (121) = 3.690, p < .001, in the 50ms SOA condition.  
Typically in semantic priming studies a significant prime x association 
strength interaction is observed such that when the right hemisphere is primed 
with a word, participants respond quickly to both high and low associated words, 
thus resulting in greater priming within the right hemisphere. Alternatively, the left 
hemisphere primes predominantly to highly related words (Chiarello, 1998). 
These priming results are not directly consistent with this literature, which 
supports a generally narrow spread of activation in the left hemisphere and a 
broad activation of semantic networks in the right hemisphere. However, the 
literature on semantic priming does not find consistent priming differences 
between high- and low-associates at all SOAs. Research in our lab has 
demonstrated that semantic priming effects are sensitive to the SOA, showing 
differential priming across hemispheres at different SOAs (e.g. Abeare et al., 
2005). In order to determine that the experiment was activating networks properly, 
reaction times for related words (high- and low-associates) were compared with 
unrelated words (neutral associates) at each of the ipsilateral conditions. When 
comparing the reaction times of related to unrelated words at the 400ms SOA 
condition, there was no difference in reaction times for related vs. unrelated 
words when the right hemisphere was stimulated exclusively; however, the 
presentation to the left hemisphere resulted in significantly faster reaction times 
for related words vs. unrelated words t(121) = 3.27, p = .002. This finding 
suggests that at the 400ms SOA, the hemispheres may not differentiate between 
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how they process high and low associates. At the 50ms SOA, no facilitation of 
word identification was found for related words when the left hemisphere had 
exclusive access to the stimuli. Here again, reaction times in the left hemisphere 
were statistically equal for high associates, low associates, and neutral target 
words suggesting that the left hemisphere processes visual stimuli efficiently, 
regardless of the semantic circumstances. Figure 3 summarizes the average 
priming for each SOA by visual field presentation.  
Lateralized Lexical Decision Making: Accuracy 
Similar findings were observed promoting the efficiency of language 
processing by the left hemisphere within the accuracy data. At 50 ms, participants 
were the most accurate when the prime and target were presented to the left 
hemisphere exclusively (mean accuracy = 93.8%) followed by conditions in which 
the prime and target were presented to the left hemisphere and right hemisphere 
respectively (mean accuracy = 89.9%). These results are followed by accuracy 
when the prime and target were presented to the right hemisphere exclusively 
(mean accuracy = 89.6%) and presentation to the right hemisphere and left 
hemisphere respectively (mean accuracy = 88%). A summary of the accuracy data 
can be found in Figure 4.  
A 2 (SOA) x 2 (Prime) x 2 (Target) repeated measures ANOVA was 
conducted to assess differences in accuracy across the three within-subject factors. 
The main effect for SOA was significant, with the 50ms SOA resulting in 
significantly more errors than the 400ms SOA, F (1, 121) = 47.365, p <. 001. 
Additionally, a significant prime x target interaction was found, F (1, 121) = 85.459, 
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p < .001. The interaction reveals that left hemisphere primes result in more errors 
when the target is presented to the right hemisphere than the left hemisphere. 
Furthermore, right hemisphere primes result in more errors when the target is 
presented to the left hemisphere than the right hemisphere. In short, ipsilateral 
presentations result in fewer errors than contralateral presentations.  
Association between measures 
Principal components analysis (PCA) was performed to identify the latent 
factors among Dogmatism, Need for Closure, Intolerance of Ambiguity, Right-
Wing Authoritarianism and the openness domain of the BFI. Although only one 
factor emerged, Right-Wing Authoritarianism and openness had low factor 
loadings at .46 and -.21, respectively, and were dropped from the latent factor. 
The emerging latent factor based on Dogmatism, Need for Closure and 
Intolerance of Ambiguity deemed “rigidity in belief updating” was used in 
subsequent analyses. PCA conducted on the three measures of political and 
sociopolitical orientation also revealed one latent factor with sufficient factor 
loadings, and its regression based latent factor scores were also used in 
subsequent analyses. Tables 9 and 10 summarize the factor loadings for each 
latent factor.  
To assess the relative contributions of the right hemisphere to the lexical 
decision-making task, a laterality index was computed from accuracy data in 
accordance with the procedure utilized by Brugger, et. al (1993). In addition, the 
degree of interhemispheric communication was estimated using indexes 
computed using similar analyses, by comparing accuracy in contralateral 
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conditions (i.e. prime to right visual field and target to left visual field) with 
accuracy in the ipsilateral conditions (i.e. prime and target to the same visual 
field). Table 8 displays the means and standard deviations for these indexes.  
A series of Pearson correlation coefficients were calculated to assess the 
primary predictions involving the associations between rigidity in belief updating, 
sociopolitical orientation and laterality indexes. In order to adjust for family wise 
error rates, the Bonferroni correction was applied. This particular correction was 
chosen because of its flexibility and established use with correlations. 
Additionally, a conservative measure of correction was desired because of the 
lack of established relationships between several of the measures in the 
literature. Tables 11 and 12 display the correlations between the variables of 
interest at each SOA.  
As presented in tables 11 and 12, the predicted relationship between 
degree of rigidity in belief updating and sociopolitical orientation was found to 
exist within our sample. Specifically, a significant, positive correlation was found 
between the two latent factors r(126) = .625, p < .01. All style of belief updating 
questionnaires were scored so that higher composite scores indicate larger 
“amounts” of the construct. Political affiliation measures were scored so that 
higher composites are indicative of more conservatism. Thus, the significant, 
positive correlation indicates that more characterological rigidity in belief updating 
was associated with more a conservative sociopolitical stance.  
At the 400 ms SOA, the proposed relationships between hemispheric 
asymmetry and the two latent factors were not observed. Degree of hemispheric 
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laterality was not significantly correlated with the rigidity in belief updating factor, 
nor the sociopolitical orientation factor. However, the indexes calculated to 
estimate the degree to which each hemisphere accepts information coming from 
its contralateral counterpart (interhemispheric communication) were found to 
significantly correlate with each of the factors at p <.01. Both of the 
interhemispheric communication indexes were found to produce significant 
correlations indicating that it does not matter if the visual information is moving 
form the left hemisphere to the right hemisphere or vice versa. Larger values on 
these particular laterality indexes are indicative of greater “communication” 
between the hemispheres. Thus, the negative correlations between these 
variables indicate that greater interhemispheric communication is associated with 
lower levels of cognitive rigidity and a more liberal political view. Given that 
previous analyses conducted on the accuracy data obtained form the LDMT 
revealed that participants tend to be more accurate in the ipsiateral condition 
compared to the contralateral condition, these findings do not indicate that 
liberals were found to be more accurate in contralateral conditions versus 
ipsilateral conditions. Rather, a larger proportion of accurate decisions consisted 
of contralateral presentations by subjects scoring low on measures conservatism 
and by less cognitively rigid individuals than by those identified as conservative 
and more cognitively rigid. As expected, since the 50ms condition yielded 
homogeneous priming, no differences were found for this condition. 
It was predicted that correlations between laterality and rigidity in belief 
updating would be stronger than the relationship between laterality and political 
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affiliation. To assess this prediction, Fisher’s r-to-Z transformations were 
conducted on significant correlations and a z-test of significance was computed. 
Given that only two of the laterality indexes were found to correlate with the 
characterological rigidity and sociopolitical latent factors at a single SOA, only 
two comparisons were made. No significant differences in the strength of the 
correlations were obtained with all values falling below the critical value of 1.96 
for two tailed tests at the .05 level of significance. 
Mediation Analyses 
 A mediator model describing the relation between lateralized hemispheric 
processing and sociopolitical orientation was proposed according to the original 
guidelines offered by Baron and Kenny (1986). The mediator model proposed 
that an individual’s degree of rigidity in belief updating mediates the association 
between laterality indexes and sociopolitical orientation. Preliminary analyses 
indicated that not all of the laterality indexes correlated with rigidity in belief 
updating and sociopolitical stance. Therefore, these relationships did not meet 
criteria for meditational analysis and were not included in subsequent regression 
analyses. That is, mediated relationships were only tested for the two indexes of 
interhemispheric communication at the 400 ms SOA.  
 To determine whether degree of rigidity in belief updating was a mediator, 
the following steps were completed: First, the predictor variable (laterality index) 
must be related to the mediator variable (rigidity in belief updating). Second, the 
predictor variable must be related to the outcome variable (sociopolitical 
orientation). Third, the mediator variable must be related to the outcome variable. 
38 
 
  
Lastly, after controlling for the effects of the mediator on the outcome, the relation 
between the predictor and the outcome must be significantly decreased. To 
determine whether the reduction could be considered significant, the Sobel test 
was used (Sobel, 1982).  
A series of three regressions was used to test for a mediation effect of 
rigidity in belief updating on the relationship between political orientation and 
each of the interhemispheric communication indexes. First, rigidity in belief 
updating was regressed on the communication index measuring the transfer of 
visual information from the right hemisphere to the left hemisphere (β = -.552, p 
< .001) and on the communication index measuring the transfer of information 
from the left to the right (β = -.532, p < .001). Second, the right-to-left 
communication index and the left-to-right communication index were regressed 
on sociopolitical orientation (β = -.643, p < .001 and β = -.551, p < .001, 
respectively). Both the right-to-left index (41%) and the left-to-right index (30%) 
contributed a significant amount of variance to political orientation. Third, political 
affiliation was simultaneously regressed on both rigidity in belief updating (β 
= .594, p < .001) and the right-to-left index (β = -.426, p < .001), on the one hand, 
and rigidity in belief updating (β = .468, p < .001) and the left-to-right index (β = -
.302, p < .001) on the other. The final regression models contributed a significant 
amount of variance to the sociopolitical orientation latent factor (30% and 46%, 
respectively).  
 The meditational roles of rigidity in belief updating on the relationship 
between interhemispheric communication (right-to-left and left-to-right) are 
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represented in Figures 5 and 6. As shown in Figure 5, the beta weight when the 
left-to-right hemispheric communication index was regressed alone on 
sociopolitical orientation was -.551. When rigidity in belief updating was entered 
into the equation, the beta weight changed from -.551 to -.302. The Sobel test 
was significant (z = -2.07, p =.032) indicating that rigidity in belief updating 
partially mediated the relationship between communication of information from 
the left to the right hemisphere and political orientation. In Figure 6, the beta 
weight when the right-to-left hemispheric communication index was regressed 
alone on sociopolitical orientation was -.643. Again, there was a decrease in the 
influence of interhemispheric communication when rigidity in belief updating is 
added to the regression equation (the beta weight changed from -.643 to -.426). 
However, this time the indirect effect was not found to be significant (z = -1.58, p 
= .056). Thus, indicating that rigidity in belief updating does not serve as a 
mediator for these specific variables.  
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CHAPTER 4 
DISCUSSION 
 The current study explored hemispheric asymmetry and interaction of 
semantic priming and their relationships with both rigidity in belief updating and 
sociopolitical orientation. Previous literature suggests that asymmetry of 
hemispheric contributions has significant relationships with cognitive tasks 
involving updating previously established belief structures about the world and 
the self.  This is the first study to explore the relationship between hemispheric 
processing of semantic meaning and belief updating in the context of 
sociopolitical orientation. The findings suggest that increased interhemispheric 
communication is inversely related to both rigidity of belief updating and a high 
degree of political conservatism. 
 The primary finding supporting differences in hemispheric contribution as 
an indicator of rigidity in belief updating was the significant correlation between 
the 400 ms SOA interhemispheric communication index and the rigidity in belief 
updating latent construct. The results from this study indicate that if each 
hemisphere offers unique contributions to the organization of belief structures as 
the literature suggests (e.g. Fink et al. 1999; Ramachandran, 1995; Goel and 
Dolan, 2003), and if one hemisphere is not afforded the opportunity to 
incorporate organizational information from the other, then it is more likely to 
result in relatively fixed belief structures.  
Additionally, the social and political psychology literature has long 
established an empirical link between rigidly constructed belief structures and 
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political conservatism. This relationship was echoed in our sample with similar 
correlation sizes between our rigidity in belief updating latent construct and 
sociopolitical latent construct (r = .625) and previously demonstrated correlations 
between the measures used to make up these latent constructs (see Jost, 2003 
for a review). The importance of hemispheric communication in the structure of 
belief systems was further supported by the correlation between the hemispheric 
communication index and sociopolitical liberalism.  
The Time Course of Semantic Priming 
The finding of the connection between hemispheric collaboration, rigidity 
in belief updating and sociopolitical orientation at the 400 ms SOA, but not the 50 
ms SOA confirms the importance of the time-course of semantic activation in the 
two hemispheres. Koivisto and his colleagues, in a series of studies (Koivisto, 
1998, 1999; Koivisto & Laine, 1995), found a different time course for activation 
of the semantic lexicon in the two hemispheres.  For example, Koivisto (Koivisto, 
1997) presented non-associated primes and targets unilaterally from the same 
categories (e.g., coffee-wine, sister-aunt) to the right or left visual field with 
stimulus onset asynchronies of 165, 250, 500, and 750 milliseconds (ms).  At the 
165 ms SOA only the LH primed.  In contrast, at 750 ms, only the RH 
presentations resulted in priming.  The intermediate SOAs produced an increase 
in priming in the RH and a decrease in the LH with longer SOAs.   
Similarly, Hutchinson, Whitman, Abeare and Raiter (2003) conducted a 
study observing the effect of high and low associates and long (e.g., 400 ms) and 
short (e.g., 50 ms) stimulus onset asynchronies (SOA) in a lateralized lexical 
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decision task. The results of this study indicate that in the short SOA condition, 
primes presented in the left hemisphere resulted in high-associate priming in 
both ipsilateral (same side) and contralateral (opposite side) presentations, 
whereas right hemisphere primes produced both high- and low-associate priming 
in both ipsilateral and contralateral presentations.  In contrast, in the long SOA 
condition, contralateral presentations resulted in high-associate priming in both 
visual field presentations.  This study confirmed that the left hemisphere uses a 
narrower spread of semantic activation and that the right hemisphere uses a 
broader spread at these SOAs, and that the pattern of activation of a hemisphere 
was transferred to the opposite hemisphere at later SOAs.   
Following Hutchinson et al (2003), Abeare, Raiter, Hutchinson, Moss and 
Whitman (2003) further investigated the interaction between hemispheres 
examining the response over time.  By examining lateralized priming at six 
different SOAs, a reciprocally cycling pattern was found during short SOAs (i.e. 
35, 50, and 200 ms) and convergence of priming during long SOAs (400 and 750 
ms).  The results suggest that one hemisphere was actively inhibited during 
periods of arousal in the other.  These findings further emphasize the importance 
of conceptualizing a dynamic interaction between the hemispheres when 
processing information. Figure 7 displays a summary of their findings. The figure 
shows that up until 400 ms the hemispheres are alternating between states of 
activation and suppression. At approximately 400 ms the significant difference in 
the degree of activation has subsided. Theoretically, it is at this time that the 
hemispheres may have moved from a state of competition for activation and are 
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now working to collaborate on information processing. This would help explain 
why we observed both greater cross-hemispheric priming and greater 
interhemispheric communication indexes, based on accuracy, at the 400 ms 
SOA.  
Mental Flexibility and Sociopolitical Orientation: The role of Hemispheric 
Collaboration   
A major prediction of the study was that cognitive style of belief updating, 
measured as degree of characterological rigidity, would mediate the relationship 
between that of lateral semantic processing and sociopolitical orientation. The 
predicted relationships between hemispheric asymmetry and both rigidity in belief 
updating and political orientation were not established. However, the mediator 
model was tested using the significant relationships between cross hemisphere 
communication and each of the latent constructs. Rigidity in belief updating style 
was found to partially mediate the relationship between interhemispheric 
communication and sosciopolitical orientation when the flow of visual information 
during the lexical decision task was from the left hemisphere to the right 
hemisphere, but not when the information moved in the opposite direction.  
Despite the lack of evidence for a strong mediator model for the 
relationship between the three constructs, the fact that significant correlations 
were found to exist between them offers insights into the relationship between 
cognitive tasks and personality structures that require mental flexibility and 
hemispheric interaction. We previously proposed (i.e. Hutchinson et al., 2003) 
that the two hemispheres function as a dynamic, interacting system utilizing a 
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left-hemisphere narrow activation of semantic networks and broad right-
hemisphere semantic activation. This is similar to proposals by Chiarello (1998) 
and Beeman et al. (1994). However, we further proposed that these two systems 
interact in a dynamic manner to provide a constant interplay between narrow and 
broad perceptions, meanings and concepts. In this manner, for example, the left 
hemisphere defines words crisply while the right hemisphere maintains the 
background arousal necessary for changes in a semantic network (e.g., changes 
in meaning). Under normal conditions, this interhemispheric interplay permits a 
continuous reconsideration of meaning and allows for creative consideration of 
alternative meanings. If the two hemispheres continuously send mirror-image 
arousal to the opposite hemisphere, then the right hemisphere has access to the 
left hemisphere’s selected meaning while the left hemisphere can access the 
right hemisphere’s broader array of activated associates. This interchange would 
be theorized to occur if a change in the local semantic context requires rapid 
reorganization around a different set of associates within the same cluster. Thus, 
each hemisphere can exploit the strength of the other without committing 
exclusively to one mode or to create a semantic system that can see both the 
forest (right hemisphere) and the trees (left hemisphere).  
The current study extends our previous model of hemispheric interaction 
in the establishment of meaning to belief formation and updating. The model 
assumes that the hemispheres take part in reciprocal exchanges of information 
such that the left hemisphere will seek to rigidly construct belief systems and the 
right hemisphere will work to incorporate newly obtained information into the 
45 
 
  
preexisting belief structure. The model was originally constructed based on 
neurological and neuropsychological research emphasizing the importance of 
larger degrees of right hemisphere dominance when accounting for an 
individual’s ability to update their belief structure. However, the results reported 
here emphasize the importance of both hemispheres working in a synergistic 
fashion, rather than the importance of hemispheric asymmetry. It is the 
hemispheric interaction that serves to underlie the degree of mental flexibility 
exhibited by the individual.  
While it would be presumptuous to assume that relative accuracy during a 
lexical decision taking task (LDMT) would serve as an indicator of cognitive 
flexibility in belief updating or mental flexibility in general, it may be better 
conceptualized as a gauge to measure the degree of interhemispheric 
communication that may be employed by the individual. For example, it is not 
likely that an individual’s performance during the LDMT represents how much 
interhemispheric communication they would employ when trying to engage in a 
cognitive task that requires mental flexibility  (e.g., incorporation of new 
information into an existing belief structure). However, someone who exhibits 
greater degrees of information sharing between the hemispheres when 
accessing semantic networks may also show greater collaboration when 
engaging in tasks requiring cognitive flexibility and set shifting. What semantic 
priming paradigms may be measuring is the efficiency of a biological mechanism 
to allow exchanges of information between the hemispheres. It is the efficiency of 
the reciprocation between the hemispheres that may affect mental flexibility.  
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Theories attempting to explain neurophysiological processes that occur 
during priming studies and the implication of interhemispheric communication 
must take into account the role of the corpus callosum. Even though there is a 
large degree of structural variance in the connections of the corpus callosum, 
neuroanotomical studies have indicated that as much as 75% of the callosal 
fibers connect homotrophic areas of the different hemispheres. This suggests 
that the corpus collosum is transferring information from analogous areas of the 
brain. However, the exact nature of the transmission is unclear. It is possible that 
the corpus callosum transmits inhibitory information to the opposite hemisphere 
(Cook, 1986), while it is also possible that the corpus callosum transmits 
excitatory information between analogous areas of each hemisphere allowing for 
both hemispheres to process relevant information.  It is possible that semantic 
priming studies are able to measure the adeptness of such a mechanism 
(Hutchinson et al., 2003; Bogen & Bogen, 1969).  
The finding that hemispheric collaboration - as measured through a 
semantic priming paradigm – is related to mental flexibility is consistent with 
results of an unpublished study conducted at the University of Windsor (McHugh, 
2009) looking at hemispheric contribution for ambiguous word resolution using a 
divided visual field (DVF) priming procedure. In that study, primes were 
presented as sentences that were puns followed by dominant and subordinate 
word targets to assess hemispheric contribution in the processing of ambiguous 
meanings. The results of the study indicate that both hemispheres are activated 
when processing puns. Also, semantic priming occurs earlier in the left than the 
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right-hemisphere. These findings can be interpreted in the context of Beeman 
and Chiarello’s (1998) model suggesting that the narrow organization of the left 
hemisphere is used to make connective inferences; this same information is 
processed by the right hemisphere to make predictive inferences and integrate 
content across broad domains, making the mind flexible enough to incorporate 
new information and seek multiple meanings.   
Hemispheric processing models of creativity also affirm the importance of 
both hemispheres in processing and updating ideas. Whitman, Holcomb and 
Zanes (2010) provide support for models of creativity arguing that the 
collaboration of differing world-views of the two hemispheres is critical to the 
cognitive processes underlying creative thinking. The study used the Torrance 
Test of Creative Thinking (TTCT), which is made up of visual and verbal 
creativity tasks where participants are required to use preexisting stimuli to come 
up with new and creative perceptions and solutions for tasks. Subjects scoring 
low on TTCT tasks showed more right hemisphere activation, consistent with the 
finding of Atchley (Atchley, Burgess et al., 1999; Atchley, Keeney et al., 1999).  
Subjects scoring high on TTCT tasks showed greater cross-hemisphere 
collaboration as indicated by greater semantic priming in contralateral 
presentation conditions. These results support previous speculations that 
hemispheric collaboration is critical for influencing creative processing involving 
mental flexibility and adaptation. (Abeare, et al., 2005; Bogen & Bogen, 1969; 
Britain, 1985; Koestler, 1964; Poreh & Whitman, 1991). 
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While the previous studies measured hemispheric contribution through 
semantic priming, which is calculated through reaction time data from the LDMT, 
our results based on accuracy data are not without merit. Studies utilizing 
accuracy data to calculate hemispheric contribution in the same manner applied 
in the current study have found differences in hemispheric arousal between 
individuals with differing belief structures regarding religiosity and paranormal 
beliefs (Brugger et al., 1993). Additionally, studies utilizing different methods of 
measuring hemispheric asymmetry have also emphasized the importance of 
hemispheric communication in cognitive flexibility. For example, Niebauer, 
Aselage, and Schutte (2002) measured the degree to which sensory illusions 
could be induced in individuals who were strongly-handed versus mixed-handed. 
The study found that more strongly handed participants reported significantly 
more degrees of the illusion than mixed handed participants. These findings 
furthered their assumption that paradigm shifts engendered by the right 
hemisphere required interhemispheric communication, and that degree of 
handedness could be used as a proxy of left-right data transfer.  
Imaging studies have also recognized bilateral activation during tasks 
relying on cognitive flexibility. An event-related Functional Resonance Imaging 
study (fMRI) found greater bilateral activation characterized by early left 
hemisphere dorsolateral prefrontal cortex activity and later activity in the right 
hemisphere’s dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and parietal and temporal lobes when 
completing neuropsychological measures of set-shifting (Smith, Taylor, Brammer 
& Rubia, 2004). While degree of communication was not directly measured, 
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these results emphasize the importance of information processing by both 
cerebral hemispheres. Additionally, a PET study investigating the neural 
correlates of the self/other distinction highlighted the importance of information 
processing by both hemispheres when engaging in social tasks relying on 
cognitive flexibility and the capacity to take on the perspective of another 
individual (Ruby & Decety, 2003).  
Research among social and political psychologists also emphasizes 
bipartisan differences in mental adaptation similar to those used in the research 
examining creativity, ambiguous word resolution and shifting of concepts. For 
example, conservatives have been found to demonstrate less integrative 
complexity (Tetlock, 1983; Tetlock et al., 1984; Gruenfeld, 1995), cognitive 
flexibility (Sidanius, 1985) and cognitive complexity (Sidanius, 1985; Hinze et al., 
1997; Altemeyer, 1998). Empirical studies have also found differences between 
liberals and conservatives with regard to creative appreciation and expression. 
Specifically, compared to conservatives, liberals have been found to have a 
higher preference for complex and abstract paintings (Wilson et al., 1973), 
preference for complex poems (Gillies & Campbell, 1985), expression of complex 
poems (Gillies & Campbell, 1985), preference for unfamiliar music (Glasgow & 
Carier, 1985) and preference for ambiguous text (McAllister & Anderson, 1991). 
Given these findings, it makes sense that differences in cross-hemispheric 
communication would exist amongst liberals and conservatives when differences 
in mental flexibility and hemispheric integration are also present.  
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Future Directions and Limitations 
The current study offers insight into directions for future research based 
on contemporary views regarding the development of the conservative ideology. 
Researchers have proposed several theories declaring the role of fear and threat 
in promoting a rigid belief structure and conservative worldview (Jost et al., 2007; 
Greenberg et al., 1992; Doty, Peterson & Winter, 1991). Research suggests that 
individuals high in anxiety are more vigilant for threatening words than are 
individuals who are not highly anxious (Richards & French, 1992). In addition, 
those with anxiety often interpret ambiguous stimuli as threatening in content 
(Calvo, Eysenck, & Castillo, 1997). Lexical decision tasks (LDT) have 
demonstrated that anxiety-provoking words attract attention and use greater 
attention resources than less anxiety-provoking words (Calvo & Castillo, 2005).  
Further, it has been shown that the right hemisphere (RH) is more vigilant for 
threatening stimuli (e.g. Van Strien & Valstar, 2004).  It has also been found that 
the degree of self-reported trait anxiety increases vigilance to threat, and 
subsequently the speed of recognition as measured by the reaction time to a 
threat-related word primed by a homograph with threat and neutral meaning 
(Richards & French, 1992).   
Future research should explore the relationship between threat, 
interhemispheric interaction and rigidity in belief updating and sociopolitical 
orientation. In view of the findings of the current study, even greater differences 
in interhemispheric interaction between those scoring high and low on measures 
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of political conservativism may be observed in the processing of anxiety-
provoking words or politically affiliated words. In addition, lateralized information 
processing might be primed using procedures by which the subjects’ mood is 
established through the use of movies, news clips, and other materials which 
could establish a psychological set for high or low anxiety. Under these 
conditions it could be predicted that politically conservative subjects, viewing 
threatening news clips, might show even greater polarization of semantic priming, 
and less interhemispheric interaction. 
Additional limitations to the study include the use of an undergraduate 
population sample. The average age of the sample was relatively young (22.3 
years) and two of the measures of sociopolitical orientation reflected “hot” 
political topics of the particular time period in which the measures were 
constructed. These issues may since have become irrelevant within the political 
arena. For example, the C-scale short form asks subjects to comment on their 
opinion regarding “ increased Asian immigration to the United States.” This is 
likely to be a topic that was more relevant in older age cohorts and left our 
subjects responding with a neutral stance. Expanding the research sample to 
include more advanced ages may help to increase variability within some of the 
sociopolitical measures. Increased variability may help to more accurately detect 
significant relationships between sociopolitical orientation and the other latent 
constructs. Additionally, future studies may want to include tasks, which 
objectively measure cognitive flexibility and inference-making rather than relying 
on self-reported characterological rigidity. Furthermore, while the semantic 
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priming lexical decision task is a widely used approach to exploring the 
organization of information processing, functional imaging studies, which can 
more directly infer location of activation, may lead to further insight regarding the 
collaboration of both hemispheres for belief updating. Specifically looking at 
patterns of activation while a participant is asked to engage in tasks that require 
cognitive flexibility and integration of new information with regards to political 
decision making may offer further insight.  
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Table 1. 
Chronbach’s Alpha for Questionairre Measures  Alpha   (N)  
 
RWAa        
 
Dogmatism       .819  (20) 
 
Intolerance for Ambiguity     .903  (11) 
 
BFIb        .887  (45) 
 
NFCc        .971 (42) 
 
Current Affairs      .946  (11) 
 
C-Scale (short form)     .795  (12) 
 
 
Note – aRight-Wing Authoritarianism, bBig Five Inventory, cNeed for Closure 
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Table 2. 
Sample Characteristics           
 
Total N      128 
 
Female      106  (79.7%) 
 
Mean Age      22.30  (SD = 6.6) 
 
Mean years of education    13.74  (SD = 1.34) 
 
Mean WRAT-IV standard score   94.41  (SD = 11.26) 
 
Mean WRAT-IV grade equivalent   11.00  (SD = 2.67) 
 
Self-reported political affiliation   -.360  (SD = 2.71) 
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Table 3. 
 
Means and Standard Deviations for the Reaction Time Data from the Lateralized 
Lexical Decision Making Task by Association Strength and Visual Field 
Presentation at the 50ms SOA 
 
           M         SD 
       
 High Associates 
 
Left/Left Reaction Time    520.22  222.82 
 
Left/Right Reaction Time    618.34  205.48 
 
Right/Left Reaction Time    615.97  226.97 
 
Right/Right Reaction Time    540.32  217.33 
 
 Low Associates 
 
Left/Left Reaction Time    565.38  191.89 
 
Left/Right Reaction Time    600.83  187.01 
 
Right/Left Reaction Time    620.76  173.69 
 
Right/Right Reaction Time    589.29  178.78 
 
 Neutral Associates 
 
Left/Left Reaction Time    575.85  183.72 
 
Left/Right Reaction Time    635.41  222.08 
 
Right/Left Reaction Time    620.17  201.30 
 
Right/Right Reaction Time    699.06  185.57 
 
Note: Visual field presentation is presented as prime/target.  
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Table 4. 
 
Means and Standard Deviations for the Reaction Time Data from the Lateralized 
Lexical Decision Making Task by Association Strength and Visual Field 
Presentation at the 400ms SOA 
 
           M     SD 
       
 High Associates 
 
Left/Left Reaction Time    527.56  165.43 
 
Left/Right Reaction Time    601.40  193.83 
 
Right/Left Reaction Time    606.22  183.96 
 
Right/Right Reaction Time    487.26  116.75 
 
 Low Associates 
 
Left/Left Reaction Time    554.61  198.10 
 
Left/Right Reaction Time    668.15  244.91 
 
Right/Left Reaction Time    663.12  212.92 
 
Right/Right Reaction Time    523.31  143.08 
 
 Neutral Associates 
 
Left/Left Reaction Time    602.66  210.50 
 
Left/Right Reaction Time    702.51  243.62 
 
Right/Left Reaction Time    685.75  167.36 
 
Right/Right Reaction Time    543.24  181.01 
 
Note: Visual field presentation is presented as prime/target. 
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Table 5.  
 
Means and Standard Deviations for the Priming Data from the Lateralized Lexical 
Decision Making Task by Association Strength and Visual Field Presentation at 
the 50ms SOA 
 
        M  SD 
       
 High Associates 
 
Left/Left Semantic Priming     25.32  141.21 
 
Left/Right Semantic Priming    7.27  159.93 
 
Right/Left Semantic Priming    51.83  189.58 
 
Right/Right Semantic Priming    15.16  144.00 
 
 Low Associates 
 
Left/Left Semantic Priming     5.05  141.97 
 
Left/Right Semantic Priming    25.71  176.09 
 
Right/Left Semantic Priming    45.87  180.84 
 
Right/Right Semantic Priming    -5.40  142.72 
 
Note: Visual field presentation is presented as prime/target.  
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Table 6.  
 
Means and Standard Deviations for the Priming Data from the Lateralized Lexical 
Decision Making Task by Association Strength and Visual Field Presentation at 
the 400ms SOA 
 
          M  SD 
       
 High Associates 
 
Left/Left Semantic Priming     75.09  141.10 
 
Left/Right Semantic Priming    101.11 194.35 
 
Right/Left Semantic Priming    79.53  197.08 
 
Right/Right Semantic Priming    56.38  129.01 
 
 Low Associates 
 
Left/Left Semantic Priming     48.05  170.88 
 
Left/Right Semantic Priming    34.36  213.66 
 
Right/Left Semantic Priming    22.62  152.26 
 
Right/Right Semantic Priming    20.33  125.28 
 
Note: Visual field presentation is presented as prime/target.  
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Table 7.  
 
Means and Standard Deviations for the Accuracy Data from the Lateralized 
Lexical Decision Making Task by Visual Field Presentation at the 50ms and 
400ms SOA 
 
        M  SD 
       
  50ms SOA 
 
Left/Left Accuracy       90%  9% 
 
Left/Right Accuracy      88%  10% 
 
Right/Left Accuracy      90%  10% 
 
Right/Right Accuracy     94%  8% 
 
  400ms SOA 
 
Left/Left Accuracy      95%  8% 
 
Left/Right Accuracy      90%  12% 
 
Right/Left Accuracy      91%  11% 
 
Right/Right Accuracy     97%  7% 
 
Note: Visual field presentation is presented as prime/target. All accuracies have been rounded to 
the nearest whole number.  
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Figure 1. 
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Figure 2. 
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Figure 3. 
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Figure 4. 
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Table 8. 
 
Means and Standard Deviations for Percent Accuracy and Laterality Index 
 
      50 ms SOA            400 ms SOA 
           n = 122                 n = 122           
Measure     M SD   M SD 
 
Percent correct in LVF   89.60 9.03   97.00 8.57  
 
Percent correct in RVF   93.80 8.00   95.00 7.69 
 
Percent correct RVF/LVF   89.90 10.34   91.20 12.95 
 
Percent correct LVF/RVF   88.00 10.02   90.00 11.03 
 
LI = LVFc – RVFc    -0.02 0.05   -0.01 0.02 
       LVFc +RVFc  
 
IHC = LVFc/RVFc – RVFc   -0.01    0.06   -0.03 0.06 
RtoL   LVFc/RVFc + RVFc 
 
IHC = RVFc/LVFc – LVFc   -.050 0.05   -.040 0.06 
LtoR   RVFc/LVFc + LVFc 
 
Note. – LVF = left visual field; RVF = right visual field; LI = laterality index; IHC = interhemispheric 
communication Index; RtoL = movement of information from right hemisphere to left hemisphere; 
LtoR = movement of information from left hemisphere to right hemisphere 
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Table 9. 
 
Rigidity in Belief Updating Latent Factor  
 
Measure     Factor Loading % Variance 
       
Intolerance of Ambiguity          .806       64.98 
 
Need for Cognitive Closure                   .805       16.36  
 
Dogmatism                      .797                 18.65 
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Table 10. 
 
Sociopolitical Orienation Latent Factor  
 
Measure     Factor Loading % Variance  
       
C-Score (short form)         .802        17.68 
 
Single-item measure         .801        20.90  
 
Current Affairs          .997        61.41 
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Table 11. 
 
 
Pearson Correlations Between Laterality Indexes at 50 ms, Belief Updating and 
Political Affiliation Factors 
             
 
 
Note. – aRigidity in belief updating factor; bSociopolitical affiliation factor; cStandard Laterality 
Index (Contribution of Left Hemisphere vs. Right Hemisphere); dInterhemispheric Communication 
Index (degree to which the left hemisphere accepts information coming from the right 
hemisphere); eInterhemispheric Communication Index (degree to which the right hemisphere 
accepts information coming from the left). Laterality Indexes are reported in visual field.  
* p < .05,  ** p < .01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Belief 
Update 
 
Politcal 
Orient 
 
RvL 
 
LRvR 
 
RLvL 
Belief 
Updatea 
 
1.00 
    
Politcal 
Orientb 
 
.625** 
 
1.00 
   
RvLc  
-.042 
 
.064 
 
1.00 
  
LRvRd  
-.178 
 
-.055 
 
-.092 
 
 
1.00 
 
RLvLe  
-.165 
 
-.135 
 
.073 
 
.488** 
 
1.00 
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Table 12.  
 
 
Pearson Correlations Between Laterality Indexes at 400 ms, Belief Updating and 
Political Affiliation Factors 
             
 
 
Note. – aRigidity in belief updating factor; bSociopolitical affiliation factor; cStandard Laterality 
Index (Contribution of Left Hemisphere vs. Right Hemisphere); dInterhemispheric Communication 
Index (degree to which the left hemisphere accepts information coming from the right 
hemisphere); eInterhemispheric Communication Index (degree to which the right hemisphere 
accepts information coming from the left). Laterality Indexes are reported in visual field.  
* p < .05,  ** p < .01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Belief 
Update 
 
Politcal Aff 
 
RvL 
 
LRvR 
 
RLvL 
Belief 
Updatea 
 
1.00 
    
Politcal Affb  
.625** 
 
1.00 
   
RvLc  
-.141 
 
-.081 
 
1.00 
  
LRvRd  
-.552** 
 
-.643** 
 
-.048 
 
 
1.00 
 
RLvLe  
-.532** 
 
-.551** 
 
.051 
 
.630** 
 
1.00 
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Figure 5. 
  
 
 
 
 
  
Note: 
Numbers 
outside 
parentheses 
refer to 
correlations. 
Numbers 
within 
parentheses 
refer to 
standardized 
path 
coefficients.  
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Figure 6.  
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Figure 7.  
 
Differential Patterns of Hemispheric Activation at Six Different SOAs  
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 Bias in mental representations and belief systems has been linked to 
asymmetries in information processing by the two hemispheres in research that 
uses wide variety of methodologies and participant samples. Also, associations 
have been drawn between such biases in belief systems and sociopolitical 
orientation leading to the hypothesis that links can be drawn from lateral processing 
through cognitive style to social and political orientation. This study sought to 
examine individual differences in laterality – as assessed via a lateralized semantic 
priming methodology – and manifestations of rigidity and flexibility in belief updating 
within a sociopolitical context. Analyses revealed that a theoretical inference of 
hemispheric communication based on accuracy data from the lexical decision 
making task was significantly related to self-reported charectorlogical rigidity and 
sociopolitical orientation. Specifically, greater communication between the 
hemispheres was significantly correlated with a lower degree of characterological 
rigidity and sociopolitical liberalism. This study proposes a dual hemispheric model 
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for mental flexibility and belief adaptation such that the hemispheres participate in a 
reciprocal exchange of information whereby the left hemisphere seeks to rigidly 
construct belief systems while the right hemisphere works to incorporate new 
information into these existing structures. Efficient communication between the 
hemispheres allows for greater malleability in personal ideologies, which was found 
to be related to a more liberal worldview in our sample.  
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